Why Pakistan Needs a Separate Constitutional Court

Pakistan’s judicial structure, inherited from the colonial era, centralizes all appellate and constitutional jurisdictions in the Supreme Court under Article 175(1) of the Constitution. While this unified system has ensured consistency in judicial interpretation, it has also burdened the Supreme Court with an overwhelming docket, causing delays in justice and diffusing its focus on constitutional matters.
The 26th Amendment attempted to address this challenge by introducing a “Constitutional Bench” within the Supreme Court to handle specialized constitutional cases. However, the experiment proved unsustainable. Lacking an independent legal identity, the bench created confusion over its jurisdiction, composition, and the binding effect of its decisions. Rather than clarifying the lines between appellate and constitutional functions, it blurred them, drawing criticism from jurists and legal experts.
The 27th Amendment aims to resolve this structural anomaly by establishing a separate Federal Constitutional Court . Importantly, this reform does not reduce the Supreme Court’s authority or prestige. Instead, it strengthens the judiciary by dividing responsibilities logically: the Supreme Court remains the final appellate forum for civil, criminal, tax, corporate, and special law matters under Article 185, while the FCC focuses exclusively on constitutional interpretation, federal–provincial disputes, advisory opinions, and appeals arising from high court decisions under Article 199.
This dual-track model mirrors international practices. Germany’s Bundesverfassungsgericht, Italy’s Corte Costituzionale and Turkey’s Constitutional Court demonstrate that constitutional courts can function alongside apex appellate courts efficiently. Even India, which maintains a unified Supreme Court, relies on specialized benches for constitutional interpretation—a model Pakistan now aims to institutionalize permanently.
Under the proposed Article 175B, the FCC will have original jurisdiction over constitutional interpretation, questions regarding federal and provincial powers, enforcement of fundamental rights of national importance, and advisory opinions sought by the President. Appeals from high court judgments invoking constitutional jurisdiction will also lie before the FCC, ensuring uniform interpretation and consistency across the country.
The Supreme Court will continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction in civil, criminal, tax, and commercial cases. Its decisions will remain binding under Article 189, except on matters exclusively assigned to the FCC. The FCC’s interpretations, like those of constitutional courts elsewhere, will be final and binding on all state organs, preserving judicial coherence and constitutional supremacy.
A forward-looking dimension of this reform is the proposal to replicate the constitutional court model at the provincial level. Provincial constitutional courts or benches could handle matters of local constitutional interpretation, provincial government disputes, and enforcement of fundamental rights within the province. Such decentralization would improve access to justice, reduce the burden on federal institutions, and reflect the spirit of Articles 142 and 146, which emphasize legislative and administrative federalism.
The advantages of a separate constitutional court are clear. First, it institutionalizes specialization, allowing constitutional matters to be handled by jurists with expertise in public law, federalism, and rights jurisprudence. Second, it ensures faster justice by offloading constitutional cases from the Supreme Court’s overburdened docket. Third, it promotes federal harmony by providing a structured forum for resolving intergovernmental disputes. Fourth, it fosters consistent constitutional jurisprudence, reducing fragmentation in judicial precedents. Finally, it strengthens public confidence, as a separate, dedicated court signals accountability, transparency, and judicial independence.
The proposed reform does not affect the appointment or tenure safeguards for judges. All protections guaranteed under Articles 175 and 209 remain intact, ensuring that the independence, impartiality, and integrity of the judiciary are preserved.
By distinguishing two parallel but complementary streams of justice—one for constitutional adjudication and the other for appellate review—the 27th Amendment creates institutional clarity without undermining existing structures. It preserves the Supreme Court’s appellate primacy while elevating constitutional interpretation to a dedicated platform.
In Pakistan’s evolving constitutional democracy, a responsive and specialized judiciary is essential. The establishment of the Federal Constitutional Court under Article 175B is a necessary modernization, harmonizing with global constitutional practices while addressing Pakistan’s unique governance challenges. Where the 26th Amendment’s constitutional bench experiment created ambiguity, the FCC introduces clarity, efficiency, and coherence.
Ultimately, this reform is not about creating competing courts—it is about strengthening the judicial system, ensuring swift and accessible justice, and upholding the supremacy of the Constitution. For Pakistan, the Federal Constitutional Court represents an institutional and democratic milestone, promising consistency, specialization, and public confidence in constitutional governance.