Pakistan’s Civil–Military Coordination

Pakistan’s civil–military coordination remains fragmented, undermining both governance and national development. In 2023, the army launched the Special Investment Facilitation Council to fast-track investment projects, but ministries such as finance, commerce, and petroleum lagged in aligning policies and fiscal frameworks. The result: investor engagement was strong, but project execution remained inconsistent.
By contrast, countries like Vietnam and Turkey demonstrate how integrated civil–military structures enhance efficiency. In Vietnam, the military-industrial complex operates under a unified economic-development command, merging policy with execution. In Turkey, the National Security Council enables civilian and military authorities to jointly plan, budget, and implement programs, creating a continuous policy engine.
In Balochistan, military-led projects – including FWO roads, Gwadar fencing, and dam works – move forward under GHQ direction, yet provincial departments rarely integrate them into long-term planning or the PSDP framework. The military builds, but the civilian side neither maintains nor monetizes these projects, leading to duplication, limited local ownership, and wasted fiscal potential. Comparable models in Indonesia, Sweden, and Chile show how civil–military integration can extend into disaster management, community development, and governance.
At the heart of Pakistan’s challenge is Article 243 of the Constitution. Though deceptively short, it creates ambiguity in command: Clause (1) gives “control and command of the armed forces” to the federal government, Clause (3) grants powers to the president “subject to law,” and Clause (4) complicates matters further by involving the prime minister in appointments of top military leadership. The outcome: three centers of gravity, no single line of command.
Today, Pakistan’s military commands practically, the prime minister commands politically, and the president commands symbolically. This diffusion weakens national coordination and slows critical decision-making, especially in crises. Modern threats – from cyber attacks to hybrid warfare – demand rapid responses measured in hours, not weeks. South Korea’s National Security Office demonstrates how centralized decision-making enables instant action in such scenarios.
Pakistan’s success depends on converging its dual power centers – civilian legitimacy and military capability – into a single, coherent national command. Article 243 must evolve from a ceremonial clause into a robust command doctrine, clearly defining authority, embedding accountability, and eliminating ambiguity. Only then can Pakistan speak with one voice, act with one strategy, and secure its national interests effectively.