Terror Groups And The Dynamics of Sectarian Violence

ISLAMABAD: The suicide bombing on Islamabad Imambargh is a clear indication that ISIS-Khorasan is back in the business of targeting Pakistani Shia community and their places of worship after a brief period in which they and their activities were overshadowed by the media coverage of Pakistan military operations against Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Pakistan’s tensions with Afghan Taliban.

In 2025 ISIS-Khorasan’s activities in Pakistan remained limited in scale as this year was dominated by Groups like Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Baloch Liberation Army (BLA). The February, 2025 suicide bombing at the Darul Uloom Haqqania seminary during Friday prayers was the only significant attack carried out by ISIS-Khorasan inside Pakistani territory. Perhaps this attack could be counted as a rarity as far ISIS-Khorasan is concerned as it doesn’t target non-Shia targets.

ISIS-K has remained focused on sectarian operations targeting Shia Hazara community in Balochistan and Shia congregations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Since 2016, the group has conducted at least 15 suicide attacks in Pakistan, which have killed more than 550 people. Of these, 10 attacks specifically targeted civilians, with a significant portion directed at Shia mosques and gatherings

At the theological level ISIS-K considers  Shia Muslims as “apostates” (rawafid). They employ a policy of unrestricted mass-casualty attacks on civilian targets to undermine state authority and incite sectarian civil war.  They frequently target “soft” Shia sites such as mosques, schools, and religious processions. In 2024–2025, ISIS-K has intensified its focus on “internationalizing” these attacks, targeting Shia sites even in neighboring Iran to project power beyond the region.

On the other hand The TTP has undergone a “rebranding” since 2018, attempting to distance itself from indiscriminate sectarianism to focus on its war against the Pakistani state. Under current leadership, the TTP officially claims it does not target religious minorities or Shias as a primary objective, focusing instead on Pakistani security forces. While they avoid high-profile sectarian claims to prevent public backlash, they maintain “informal” operational links with sectarian groups.

It is not that TTP has never been involved in sectarian violence. They have remained allied with Pakistani sectarian groups and have engaged in sectarian violence before ISIS-K jumped into the field.

Shia community was targeted by the tribal militants throughout this period, despite the fact that this community was not directly part of the conflict going on in the tribal areas. Shia quasi-political organizations did start a campaign against extremism after the community came under wave of suicide attacks across the country—but this political campaign was apparently not the cause, which prompted the militants to start targeting the community.

In fact, the Shia community came under suicide attacks by the militants right from the start of wave of suicide attacks across Pakistan. Imambargahs and Shia religious processions and funerals were targeted in cities like Dera Ismail Khan, Dera Ghazi Khan and Peshawar, killing scores of people. The state machinery, however, remained helpless in giving protection to the community.

Most of these suicide attacks took place in cities of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, however Punjab was not completely immune from these attacks. A suicide bomber blew himself up at the entrance of an Imambargah on April 5, 2009, in Sargodha killing 24 people, including three children. On December 24, 2009, a suicide bomber blew himself outside an Imambargah in Shakrial village within the Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT).

On December 28, 2009 an Ashura procession was attacked by a suicide bomber in Karachi killing 42 people on the spot, which ultimately led to riots in the city. During this period the Shia community continued to feel vulnerable throughout the country as suicide bomber continued to strike the religious events and religious buildings across the country in cities like Quetta, Sargodha, Lahore, Hangu and other places.

The impression that the Taliban groups and other militants used terror as a weapon only against the state machinery is wrong. This analysis partially repudiates the theory that Taliban were using suicide bombings only as a strategic tool to weaken the resolve of state machinery and military leadership to continue the military operations in erstwhile tribal areas.

This theory doesn’t fully explain why pensioners outside a commercial bank in Rawalpindi were targeted or why Shia religious procession became the target of bombings—when apparently none of these people were partners of the state machinery, which was carrying out military operation against militants in the tribal areas.

Suicide bombings on civilians showed the savagery of Pakistani Taliban was on full display. Most of this type of suicide bombings took place in 2009.
One such attack took place in Jumrud, Khyber, on March 27, 2009. About 48 people were killed and 170 injured when a mosque packed with worshippers collapsed after a bomb blast during Friday prayers.

Khyber Agency administrator Tariq Hayat Khan blamed the defunct Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan for the carnage. Another such suicide attack where general public was the target took place on October 9, 2009 in Peshawar’s busy bazaar where 49 people, including a woman and seven children, were killed.

Reportedly, a suicide attacker detonated his explosives-laden car at the crowded Soekarno Chowk in Khyber Bazaar. Separately, in Islamabad, two suicide blasts on October 20, 2009 rocked the new campus of the International Islamic University Islamabad (IIUI) in H-10 sector of Islamabad, killing at least six students and staffers, including two female students, and injuring more than 29 others.

Another such gruesome incident took place in Rawalpindi on November 2, 2009 when a suicide bomber hit a bank killing 36 people and wounding over 65 others. Four soldiers were also among the dead.  The bomber blew himself up outside the National Bank of Pakistan (NBP) on the Khadim Hussain Road, where people had lined up to draw their salaries and pensions.

It seems different groups, with all their well publicized rivalries, are working in unison, as far as attacks on Pakistani state institutions are concerned. There may be a neat division of labor between these groups. For instance TTP was engaging in sectarian violence before ISIS-Khorasan jumped into the arena. After 2016 it is ISIS-K which exclusively engages in sectarian violence.