Washington, Delhi and Tehran: What Pakistan’s Kashmir Demarche Means
ISLAMABAD: Pakistan’s decision to summon the US Chargé d’Affaires and lodge a strong demarche over Ambassador Sergio Gor’s description of Jammu and Kashmir as an “important part of India” raises questions that go beyond the immediate diplomatic controversy.
Islamabad says the remarks contradict the longstanding US position that Kashmir is disputed and must be resolved in accordance with relevant UN Security Council resolutions.
But the incident comes at a particularly important moment, when Pakistan and the United States have developed an unusually close working relationship over the Gulf crisis and Pakistan has emerged as a channel between Washington and Tehran.
First, will the demarche damage the improving Pakistan-US relationship? Probably not fundamentally. A demarche is a serious diplomatic protest, but it is also an established instrument for containing disagreements without allowing them to disrupt broader relations. Islamabad has invested considerable political capital in improving ties with Washington, while the US has found Pakistan useful in dealing with the Iran crisis. Pakistan’s recent diplomatic role in facilitating contacts between Washington and Tehran, as well as its subsequent efforts to restart negotiations, demonstrates that the relationship has acquired an immediate strategic utility beyond the old security framework of Afghanistan.
The real test will be Washington’s response. If Gor’s statement is treated as an isolated remark and the US avoids formally redefining its position on Kashmir, the controversy may remain manageable. Pakistan’s demarche, therefore, can be read as an attempt to register a red line while preserving the wider relationship.
Second, does the statement indicate that Washington and New Delhi are putting their relationship back on track? Here, the significance may be greater. Strategically, the United States still has powerful reasons to cultivate India. The central structural factor remains China. Washington sees India as an important Asian power capable of contributing to a broader balance against Chinese influence. Pakistan’s improved relations with the US do not eliminate this logic; rather, Washington can simultaneously seek Pakistan’s cooperation in the Gulf and maintain a strategic partnership with India in Asia.
Gor’s visit to Srinagar and his remarks could therefore be interpreted as diplomatic reassurance to India, particularly if Delhi had concerns about Washington’s renewed engagement with Islamabad. Yet one statement on Kashmir does not by itself prove that all strains in US-India relations have disappeared. The more likely conclusion is that Washington is pursuing parallel relationships: transactional cooperation with Pakistan where Pakistan is indispensable, and a longer-term strategic investment in India because of China.
Third, what does this mean for Pakistan’s role as a mediator in the Gulf war? The immediate impact should be limited. Pakistan’s mediation depends primarily on its ability to maintain working access to both Washington and Tehran. Indeed, Pakistan has continued diplomatic efforts despite repeated setbacks and has invited Iranian negotiators to Islamabad to explore renewed engagement.
However, the episode is a reminder of the limits of Pakistan’s diplomatic influence. Islamabad can be a valuable mediator without becoming a strategic equal of Washington. The US may need Pakistan in the Gulf while simultaneously backing India on issues central to Pakistan’s own regional interests. That contradiction will define the challenge ahead: Pakistan must preserve its mediation role and the benefits flowing from closer US ties without allowing temporary strategic usefulness to create illusions about a permanent convergence of interests.
